




A Way Out of the Seventeenth-Century: 




Abstract. The ethnocentric legacy of human rights discourse is expressed in 
individualistic legal and moral approaches that inform most philosophical reflections 
on human rights. I will sketch a path towards a broader theoretical framework that 
can better sustain and articulate human rights claims of human dignity and well-
being. For this purpose, I reconsider human rights discourse within the general 
modern context. In particular, I describe human rights entitlement as an instance of 
a fundamentalist modern approach that is constructed upon supposedly objective 
facts that assume the value-free order of nature. I underscore that acknowledging the 
performativity of science can assist to disentangle contemporary thought in general, 
and human rights discourse in particular, from modern fundamentalist assumptions. 
Finally, I suggest that we reconceptualise human rights as the result of negotiation 
processes, in which all humans are potential stakeholders.  
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Modernity retold: a sketch 
 
Stephen Toulmin (1990) describes seventeenth-century natural philosophy as a withdrawal from 
the Renaissance. In particular, he explains that modern philosophers since René Descartes 
discard local, oral, particular and time-bound knowledge, sever facts from values, art from 
science, reason from emotion and lock the political field within the mirroring enclosures of the 
state and the individual. Of course, as Dewey (1988) reminds us, Western philosophy since 
classical times has generally acknowledged the priority of universal and immutable knowledge. 
Moreover, Christianity restated this priority in theological terms, and since the eleventh-century 
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theological and juridical rationalism has emphasised the derivation of knowledge from universal 
truths (Berman, 1983). Nevertheless, European urban civilisation emerged to work out a self-
centred and autonomous culture, which became increasingly engaged with specificity and change 
as the proper objects of knowledge.  
 
This engagement came abruptly to an end in the wake of the religious wars that followed the 
Reformation. Between 1590 and 1640, Western thought was dramatically reoriented by a quest 
for certainty, which became the touchstone for a new natural philosophy (Dewey, 1988). The 
founders of modern science reacted to a clash of Christianities based on opposing and 
irreconcilable theological certainties, by building another absolute certainty, the notion of an 
objective natural world (Toulmin, 1990). In other words, as the religious wars crushed belief in 
the same one god, natural philosophers appealed to the supposed objective commonality of 
god’s product, i.e. nature. The order of nature was supposed to mirror the perfection of its 
maker. Following the horrors of the civil wars, natural philosophers believed that the order of 
nature would have guaranteed the political order, which they praised more than civil liberties and 
personal freedom. In addition, since Galileo (1977) the natural order was conceived as a 
mathematical language, and this language became, from Descartes on, the main example and 
model of certain knowledge (Descartes, 1988). A few years after the publication of Descartes’ 
Discourse on Method, Leibniz (1956) even imagined a universal computational language, so that 
reasoning could be performed as a kind of calculation. Whilst we might appreciate Leibniz’ 
ecumenical motivations, we are still to confront the avatars of his monosemantic nightmare. 
 
Seventeenth-century natural philosophers structured modern thought around a group of 
theoretical dichotomies. These dichotomies stemmed from the Cartesian separation between 
mind and body, and they included the opposition of mental and material, action and phenomena, 
act and event, thought and object, voluntary and mechanical and creativity and repetition. 
During the last three centuries the resulting theoretical structure has been alternatively 
dismantled and rebuilt around the notion of scientific objectivity, which finally came under 
attack from within the hard sciences. However, the unprecedented tragedy of the First World 
War delayed the dismissal of philosophical foundationalism and its quest for certainty. As 
Toulmin (1990, 159) observes:   
 
The ideas of strict ‘rationality’ modelled on formal logic, and of a universal ‘method’ for 
developing new ideas in any field of natural science, were adopted in the 1920s and 1930s with 
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even greater enthusiasm, and in an even more extreme form, that had been the case in the mid-17th 
century.  
 
Moreover, after the subsequent catastrophe of the Second World War, which replicated on a 
global scale the devastation of seventeenth-century religious conflict, belief in the supposed 
progressive value of mathematical forms went even further. On opposite sides of the Atlantic, 
the influence of logical positivism and structuralism brought mathematical tools into fields of 
humanities (Rorty, 1994), well beyond the original Cartesian program. Reaction to this neo-
formalist and objectivist offensive instead of transcending seventeenth-century dualism 
confirmed it. For example, Martin Heidegger (1977) restated the supposedly essential link 
between physics and technology even more persuasively than a positivist apologist of science.  
 
The process of decolonisation, student revolts of the long sixties and the feminist movement 
jointly exposed the synecdochical nature of modern institutions, which since their inception hid 
the interest of a part (Western, white, upper-class, male and able-bodied) behind the much 
vaunted whole. Ironically, the young rebels could expose the modern synechdoche because they 
took the boastful promises of modernity at face value, and therefore demanded their fulfilment. 
In particular, the request to immediately apply fundamental democratic principles uncovered the 
hiatus between an institution’s formal values and its institutional practices. Unfortunately, this 
gap could not be filled because, at least since the seventeenth-century, the declarations of a 
natural order were a rhetorical strategy to justify an authority that was either already in place or in 
the making. Since the seventeenth-century the declared primacy of fundamental principles had 
performed the role of a smokescreen, hiding the complexity of social, political and economic 
interactions. Such complexity was eschewed rather than conceptually addressed by modern 
concepts of power, meaning and value. From this perspective, we can read Jean François 
Lyotard’s acknowledgement of the failure of grand narratives (Lyotard, 1984) as an expression of 
his regret for having engaged in the correct political struggle with the wrong theoretical weapons.  
 
Though the total revolt of the long sixties hardly accomplished its declared tasks, it gave both 
scientists and philosophers the opportunity to openly question the meaning, scope and content 
of their activities. Such an unprecedented opening resulted in a generalised critical anamnesis, i.e. a 
recollection, through which modernity elaborated its own meanings (Lyotard, 1992). 
Unfortunately, since the late 1970s this opening has been reframed in textbooks and media as a 
quarrel between modernists and postmodernists. However, the process of reconsideration of 
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modernity moved on regardless of this reductive framing. The more the meanings of modernity 
were explored outside of the framework of apologetic or teleological perspectives, the clearer 
such a framework appeared as a pervasive constraint in shaping modern realities. In other words, 
the more that modern Western thought was stripped of pretensions of objectivity and 
universality, the clearer appeared the moulding effect of such pretensions on modern realities. 
The less that modern Western thought was credited with consistency, coherence and cogency, 
the more its very identity tended to fragment into a constellation of discourses. It appeared that 
modern Western thought could exert its pervasive influence despite its disunity. Bruno Latour 
(1988) even points out that Western actual multiplicity is the strength that ultimately allowed the 
West to conquer the world. 
 
Modern thought channelled multiplicity into disciplinary areas according to well established 
evolutionary patterns of disciplinary histories. These described the emergence of scientific 
disciplines as a progressive convergence of a multiplicity of sources arising from foundational 
principles (Feyerabend, 1988). These principles provided the new disciplines with a conceptual 
identity, just like Newton’s Principia did with physics. As a matter of fact, physics’ envy compelled 
modern thinkers to accommodate Western knowledge into the Procrustean bed of the 
Newtonian model. As Prygogine and Stengers (1997, viii) state, ‘we have come to the end of the 
road paved by Galileo and Newton’ not only because biology is replacing physics as a model for 
knowledge but, more importantly, because of the reappraisal of both the modern endeavour and 
its actual implementations. The recognition of a hiatus between modern narratives and actual 
modernities has triggered a wide range of reactions, which span from Jurgen Habermas’ nostalgia 
for an idealised modernity as an allegedly unfinished project (Habermas, 1981), to Latour’s 
acknowledgment that we actually have never been modern, because we have never been able to 
fulfil the contradictory claims of modern narratives (Latour, 1993). In particular, science’s claim 
to mirror the world is beginning to be confronted by the recognition that all science is 
performative. Such recognition testifies that despite modern wishful thinking, actual human 
practices (including scientific research) continuously both build and blur the boundaries between 
theories and objects, facts and values, knowledge and power (Foucault, 1980).  
 
Human rights discourse retold: towards a broader framework 
 
Human rights discourse shares a performative role with modern scientific disciplines, whose 
influence in defining its theoretical framework is not yet fully acknowledged. I will underline the 
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relevance of retelling the history of modern science for a theoretical reconsideration of human 
rights discourse.  
 
First, as mentioned, the influence of physics and biology extends over the wider cultural space. 
In particular, since the seventeenth-century physics has been the model for modern scientific 
knowledge and has shaped the modern idea of nature. Moreover, the descriptive approach of 
physics has long been the standard for theoretical enquiry. Furthermore, though modern physics 
did not produce the concept of law ex novo, physical laws became the main instantiation of the 
objective regularity of the natural order of things. Also, with the Darwinian revolution biological 
science came to the fore, and in the last decades it commenced to replace physics as a model for 
other fields of knowledge. The rejection of fundamentalist naturalism and objectivism that 
emerged within these leading disciplines can assist in disentangling human rights discourse from 
its fundamentalist assumptions.  
 
Secondly, most economic theories constructed the concept of economic system on the basis of 
an underlying fundamental property, which was either the self-adjusting ability of the market or 
the objectivity of value. In both cases, the economic system was supposed to function according 
to its autonomous laws on the model of physics or, more recently, of biology. As a consequence, 
both supporters and detractors of the economic system held responsible for economic misdeeds 
the laws of the economy rather than actual economic agents. Hence, a fundamentalist belief in 
objective economic laws allowed economic agents such as firms, corporations and states to 
deflect responsibility for their actions. The acceptance of economic fundamentalism long 
confined human rights discourse outside of the sphere of economic relations, whose autonomy 
is simply taken for granted. Despite this, economists’ growing rejection of the disembeddedness 
of economic activity (Fullbrook, 2003), and an attempt to represent human capabilities, 
entanglements and well-being within economic theory (Sen, 1985) has opened the way for an 
intrinsic involvement of human rights discourse within economics.  
 
Thirdly, a more substantial link between the natural sciences and human rights discourse emerges 
from questioning the modern boundaries between nature and society. This separation was 
actually already blurred in the modern pretension that the social order should move toward the 
realisation of a natural order. For example, this pretension still justifies the neoliberal demand to 
free the market from allegedly artificial constraints, so that the market can follow its supposed 
natural course. Sociologists since Durkheim have attempted to reverse the modern pattern that 
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aims to naturalise the social dimension by proposing instead to socialise nature (Latour, 2005). 
Nevertheless, such inversion simply replaced nature with society as a fundamental source of 
meaning. Following the path breaking work of Latour, however, sociologists of science and 
technology since the 1980s have shown that the outcome of socially determined scientific 
research is able to rearrange the social context. They argue that the modern separation of 
science, technology and society is the outcome of a process of depuration of heterogeneous 
chains of associations, alliances and networks. According to Latour (1988), before such 
depuration, a dynamic mix of human and non-human actors is the context for a scientific 
controversy. After a controversy has settled, being the settlement depurated facts, the facts are 
tied again with other facts, machines with machines and social factors with social factors. Human 
rights controversies too always include a heterogeneous mix of human and non-human actors. 
The possibility of ultimately severing humans from non-humans was granted on the one hand by 
the definition of a fundamental abstract human model and on the other hand by non-humans’ 
stability, which was granted by a stable disciplinary structure of science. The exposure both of 
the Western, male, adult, able-bodied implicit characteristics of this abstract individual and of the 
fundamentalist approach of modern naturalism makes such separation problematic. For 
example, the survival rights of Mayan peoples cannot be considered apart from their traditional 
culture, their crops, their struggle against both the Mexican government and genetically modified 
food, as well as the wider debate about biological research and the interests of chemical and 
pharmaceutical corporations. In order to defend and to improve such rights, it is imperative to 
recognise that decision-making processes about nature and decision-making processes about 
society are intertwining and indistinguishable. Therefore, human rights discourse, which 
historically developed in the form of civil and political rights as the recognition of human 
entitlement to stakeholding in decision-making about society, can no longer overlook decision-
making about nature. The claiming of ecological rights is already pushing towards such 
redefinition of human entitlement. However, in order to reopen decision-making processes 
about nature to their legitimate stakeholders, i.e. all human beings, we need to reconsider how 
human entitlements could be translated into actual participation in decision-making processes in 








The economic discourse retold: a path beyond modern fundamentalism 
 
Modern economic theories are an example of the fundamentalism of modern scientific 
disciplines (Baldissone, 2008). By re-embedding economic theories into the larger fabric of 
contemporary knowledge, the links between economic fundamentalist assumptions and the 
broader modern framework come to light. Moreover, the reopening of economic discourse 
beyond the limits of modern dichotomies is allowing us to consider human rights from within 
economics or, in the words of Amartya Sen (2000), to not perceive the request for a closer 
involvement of ethics and economics as if it were an invitation to drink and drive.  
 
In the eighteenth-century Richard Cantillon (2001) and the Physiocrats first devised the 
economic structure of society as a naturally balanced circular flow between incomes and 
expenditures. The Physiocrats conceived this flow as a physical process in which wealth acted as 
a kind of energy circulating throughout society (Veca, 1977). Moreover, they looked for a 
univocal source of value, which they found in land. More importantly, they constructed the 
concept of economy upon the seventeenth-century pattern of turning possible conditions into 
natural trends, and current conditions into artificial obstacles. As a consequence, they advocated 
laissez-faire by defining historical restrictions on agricultural exchange as artificial obstacles to the 
emergence of the natural order of the economy.  
 
With an exception in terms of the equivalence of land and value, all the Physiocrats’ assumptions 
made their way into one or another subsequent economic theory. In particular, Adam Smith’s 
identification of labour as the univocal source of value (Smith, 1937) was carried on by David 
Ricardo (1970) and Karl Marx (1974), who defined the commodified version of labour that 
workers were forced to sell on the market as Arbeitskraft, i.e. labour-force. Before Marx, 
Hermann Helmholtz already used the word Arbeitskraft in his formulation of the principle of 
conservation of energy, which was intended as the common substance of phenomena as 
different as mechanical force, heat, light, electricity and magnetism (Cardwell, 1971). It is 
arguable that within economic theory, labour-value deployed the same role of an invariant 
substance underlying transformations that energy played within physics (Veca, 1977). As to the 
natural balance of economic flow, it became a self-regulating market in the work of Smith, and 




The twentieth-century mathematic formalisation of economics affected both value- and market-
based fundamentalist approaches, and restated in supposedly objective terms the faith in 
equilibrium, that is a belief in the unconditional ability of production to create demand. John 
Maynard Keynes soundly rejected the latter fundamentalist assumption, which goes under the 
pretentious definition of Say’s Law (Sweezy, 1953). Nevertheless, soon after his death Neo-
Keynesian hybrid views restated equilibrium theory. The Neo-Keynesian approach also 
promoted an unprecedented mathematisation of economic theories, which hid their prescriptive 
power behind the supposed objectivity of figures. The Neo-Keynesians, therefore, paved the way 
for neoliberal discourse, which founded its market version of the laws of the economy on the 
complete severance of fact from value.  
 
The theoretical alternative to the neoliberal concoction of early modern rationality with bits of 
information theory and evolutionary biology came instead from a reconsideration of both 
economics and economy. The demand for an economy in which people mattered, which is the 
common practical and theoretical horizon of a whole range of new heterodox economics, set a 
new agenda that ranges well beyond modern fundamentalist assumptions. In particular, Sen’s 
reassessment of economic well-being introduced value-bounded parameters into the core of 
economic evaluations. Moreover, the acknowledgement of the embeddedness of economy in 
economics found a more general expression in Callon’s recognition that ‘all science is 
performative’ (Callon, 2006, 10). This recognition charged the economists with the responsibility 
of political, social and ethical choices, which human rights discourse cannot fail to address. If we 
are at last to reject the image of economy as an unstoppable and remorseless Juggernaut, the 
opportunity to exert a positive intervention in the reshaping of economic activities could and 
should also be translated in the language of rights. Nevertheless, as previously alluded to, this 
very language is in need of historical reconsideration.  
 
Natural law, natural rights and human rights: genealogical steps  
 
The language of rights goes back well before modern times to classical antiquity. This language 
was deeply transformed during the medieval Papal Revolution, and then through the Hobbesian 
reconceptualisation of the individual subject. Definitions of human rights in twentieth-century 
declarations are both a confirmation and a challenge to the Hobbesian individualist 
anthropology, a framework which is aggressively restated by neoliberalism. During the last fifty 
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years the meaning of modernity has been widely reconsidered; we can now also rethink modern 
rights in general, and human rights in particular.  
 
In Western history nomos, i.e. the law, emerged in fifth-century B.C.E. Greece as a legal order 
relatively independent from nature. In particular, nomos expressed the citizenry belonging to the 
Greek city -states. After the latter’s political fall, the meaning of nomos shifted in Stoic thought 
towards the concept of an abstract and universal natural law (Diogenes Laertius, 1975). The Stoic 
concept was introduced by Cicero (1998) into Roman legal thought, which nonetheless never 
relied on the principle of a natural foundation of law. In particular, the Roman ius gentium  (the 
law of peoples that applied to foreigners and to their dealings with Roman citizens) evolved as a 
collection of edicts relating to foreigners rather than expressing the principle of human 
commonality (Bretone, 1999). Moreover, when in the third-century Ulpian devised the concept 
of ius naturale (natural law), he intended it as the source for all animals’ behaviour rather than a 
law that applied to humans (Justinian, 1975).  
 
Ulpian’s writings, together with those of Gaius, Paulus, Modestinus and Papinianus became 
major sources for the sixth-century compilations of Roman law commissioned by the Byzantine 
emperor Justinian. The compilations were rediscovered circa 1070 in the course of library 
researches promoted by the Gregorian Reform, which began the Papal Revolution by turning the 
church into a centralised organization. Whilst the Reform furthered the study of canon or church 
law, the discovery of the Justinianic compilations also prompted a renewed interest in Roman 
law as such. However, both Canonists and Romanists shared a completely new approach to their 
sources. ‘In contrast to the earlier Roman jurists and the earlier Greek philosophers, they 
supposed that they could prove by reason the universal truth and universal justice of 
authoritative legal texts’ (Berman, 1983, 140). At first, this approach was instrumental in 
justifying the claim of the universal jurisdiction of the Pope, as representing god’s universal 
power. Later on, the conflation of the divine, natural and legal orders was meant to legitimise 
also the sovereignty of the emperor, the king and, according to Marsilius of Padua and Bartolus, 
the whole male citizen body (Ullmann, 1965).  
 
Another substantial theoretical shift occurred in the seventeenth-century, when Thomas Hobbes 
advocated absolute monarchy to keep under control individual rights, which he defined as 
naturally conflicting. Hobbes shifted the justification for authoritarian control of human actions 
from the traditional Christian argument of post-lapsarian corruption to his new value-free 
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depiction of the state of nature. In particular, Hobbes’ fictional atomised individual was meant to 
represent a supposedly objective human nature. Though the Hobbesian anthropology was 
alternatively accepted, modified or rejected by Western modern theorists, it continued to provide 
a theoretical ground for the practice of legal, political, social and economic processes that 
converged in the construction of the modern individual subject. Radical critics of Hobbesian 
individualism such as Diderot, Rousseau and Marx questioned the very concept of an 
unchanging human nature. Nevertheless, they still relied on collective subjects as aggregates of 
individuals, and they reconfirmed the role of the Hobbesian counterpart of the individual 
subject, i.e. the state.  
 
The drafters of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights reacted to the humanitarian 
catastrophe of the two world wars by reframing the Hobbesian bipolar scheme within a universal 
structure, in order to accommodate each and every human being regardless of her national 
belonging. Whilst the declaration renewed the almost millennial natural law tradition, it founded 
the human endowment of rights on the immediate and self-sufficient attribution of humanity. 
However, it granted this attribution as a result of a depuration of human specificities, as ‘race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status’ (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, art. 2). Therefore, the declaration 
restated as a universal model the Hobbesian disembodied individual, who only can boast a 
primal disembeddedness and self-sufficiency. Moreover, it held accountable the states for the 
actual exercise of rights, which remained linked to citizenship.  
 
Human rights declarations also dealt with specific subsets of the human community as gender, 
age and ethnic groups, so that they stretched the Hobbesian theoretical framework. Cultural 
specificities have become a central issue in human rights discourse since 1993, when the 
representatives of a few East-Asian governments appealed to so-called Asian values in order to 
limit the applicability of a universal human rights standard within their countries. The 
instrumental attack on human rights sparked a lengthy debate, which could have been an 
opportunity to question not only the essentialist concept of a state-bound culture, but also its 
counterpart, namely the abstract individual. Though the threat of absolute cultural relativism to 
the very concept of human rights was widely acknowledged, the dangers of a likewise absolute 
universalism for human rights discourse are yet to be fully explored. In particular, absolute 
universalism’s dismissal of specificities continues to impose the Western disembedded individual 
subject as a model for humanity. This contributes to triggering the response of identitarianism, 
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which claims specificity as an essentialist device. Moreover, the universalist approach continues 
to constrain human rights within the limits of a minimum common denominator for the whole 
of humanity.  
 
We could perhaps overcome universalist constraints if we are able to conceive multiversal rights, 
i.e. rights capable of taking into account human differences as an added value to humanity rather 
than a threat to human commonalities. This would require the development of a philosophy of 
human rights that conceives human commonalities as an ongoing task rather than an original 
condition. Significantly, this will involve a reconsideration of the subject of human rights 
discourse, i.e. humanity itself. 
 
On the concept of humanity 
 
The concept of humanity is quite a recent acquisition in Western history. Though since classical 
antiquity several Western sources apparently stressed human commonality, they did not 
necessarily express their mainstream social, political and legal contemporary relations. Moreover, 
these sources often advocated belonging to a wider community, rather than to a universal one. 
For example, the cynic Diogenes made a cosmopolitan claim that seems to have been a 
polemical statement directed against his fellow citizens from Sinope (Heather, 1996). Moreover, 
as previously recalled Stoic universalism was a theoretical answer to the collapse of the city -states 
and their dissolution into the koiné of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Furthermore, the multicultural 
Roman state that replaced Hellenistic kingdoms gave the Roman citizen Paul the opportunity to 
extend Christian proselytising beyond the boundaries of ethnic Jewry. Since its inception, 
Christian ecumenism has hence mirrored the factual cosmopolitanism of the Roman Empire, 
whose earthly city is, in Augustine’s writing, the model for the heavenly one.  
 
Christian ecumenism was powerfully re-enacted from the eleventh-century when Pope Gregory 
VII claimed a universal jurisdiction for the papacy as god’s representative on earth (Tierney, 
1964). However, such renewed universality thrived on the separation of the pure - priests, monks 
and nuns - from the impure - lay men and women -(Le Goff, 1988), on the inward genocidal 
exclusion of Cathars and Jews among others, and the outward aggression of the crusades. In the 
fifteenth-century the Franciscan Las Casas had to fight to gain the newly ‘discovered’ 
Amerindians the right to be assimilated in the human family as potential Christian believers 
(Pagden, 1982). Unfortunately, the effects of Las Casas’ victorious struggle were not universal at 
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all. During four centuries of colonial history, and fifty years of subsequent neo-colonial 
domination, the West continued to export its civilisation; a ruthless enslaving mechanism, which 
degraded other humans and cultures to a subhuman condition. For example, indigenous 
Australians had to wait till 1967 to have their human nature legally acknowledged (Attwood and 
Markus, 2007) and a further decade for the recognition of their ability to educate their children 
(HREOC 1977). The South African apartheid system lasted even longer, and the entrapment of 
the Palestinians in the Gaza strip was crafted in recent years, and is still in place. 
 
Though sixty years have passed since the declaration of universal human rights, the issues I have 
raised are still controversial. It is pretty obvious that human rights as defined by the universal 
declaration have been insufficiently implemented. It is less obvious to question whether a 
hypothetical complete implementation would have meant the complete assimilation of non-
Western humans and cultures. As an incomplete assimilation did actually take place in the name 
of the supposed universality of Western values, an even more disturbing question concerns the 
role of Western universalism as a tool for cultural genocide. A striking example is the 
disturbingly recent case of the indigenous Australian stolen generations, whose members until 
the 1970s were forcibly separated from their families and communities to be raised according to 
the Western educational model. Without the theoretical justification of Western universal values, 
the Australian liberal opposition leader could hardly claim still in 2008 the ‘good intentions’ of 
previous Australian governments (Nelson 2008) behind such a particularly cruel and painful 
occurrence of cultural genocide.  
 
However, I am not denying that the universal concept of humanity has historically played a 
positive role in the promotion of human dignity and well-being. I am rather exposing the use of 
universality as an authoritarian rhetorical tool in order to reject an apologetic view of universality 
that is at best naïve and at worse an accomplice to Western neo-colonial domination. Following 
Wittgenstein (1953), I argue that the concept of universality has as many meanings as its possible 
uses. As human rights discourse is firstly committed to promote human dignity and well-being, I 
contend that universalist claims should be assessed against the actual uses of universalism and 
their actual ability to promote human dignity and well-being.  
 
The concept of humanity not only has different meanings, but is also an attempt to construct as 
a singularity a multiplicity of subjects. Such an attempt follows a Western authoritarian tradition 
that is used to constructing a multiplicity of subjects as a single collective entity, whose agency in 
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turn is embodied by an individual sovereign. Since the Roman jurists’ legal fiction of lex de 
imperio, with which Roman citizens relinquished their powers to the emperor (Bretone, 1999), the 
multiplicity of subjects was supposed to be reducible to a single sovereign entity. The eleventh-
century Papal Revolution restated the reduction of the multiplicity of the believers to the 
individual role of the Pope, as the representative of god’s absolute singularity. Thus the faithful 
became the limbs of the mystical body of the Church, whose head was the Roman Pontiff.  
Medieval kings by analogy were described as the head of the mystical body of the state. The 
medieval theorists Baldus even described the people themselves as men (sic) assembled into one 
mystical body. We can consider Hobbes’ contract as a variation on the theme of the Roman lex 
de imperio, and his concept of the Leviathan as another representation of the state mystical body. 
Rousseau’s concept of general will (Rousseau, 1968) is not far from Baldus’ anthropomorphic 
imagery. Moreover, despite Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers (Montesquieu, 
1989), the head of government of a modern representative democracy, and especially of a 
presidential republic, even literally embodies the medieval anthropomorphic metaphor of a single 
body politic.  
 
Within human rights discourse, humanity has been addressed through synecdochical means, 
namely as the individual modern subject. This subject is intended as the basic unit of humanity, 
which is understood as an aggregate of individuals. Hence, the singularisation of the actual 
multiplicity of human subjects is realized by conceiving humanity as the result of a simple 
repetition of the same abstract individual. Whilst in late Roman law and in medieval political 
theology such singularisation relied on the specific function of the sovereign, the singularisation 
of the multiplicity of human subjects into the modern concept of humanity relies instead on the 
non-specificity of the individual subject.  Following the model of the abstract legal subject, the 
individual represents humanity just as in a scientific laboratory where a specific event represents 
a general natural law. In other words, the concept of humanity follows the model of the modern 
abstract universality of law and nature, of which individual events and subjects are instantiations. 
 
Social and economic rights brought into human rights discourse a transindividual dimension. 
This new dimension was later confirmed by the declaration of collective rights, which apply to an 
aggregate of individuals that is smaller than the whole of humanity. In particular, as collective 
rights took account of the embeddedness of actual subjects, these rights challenged the empty 
indetermination of the abstract individual. However, the actual multiplicity of human subjects 
cannot be addressed only at a supraindividual level, because it also cuts across individuals 
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themselves. Therefore, individuals’ multiple belongings also need to be translated into the 
language of rights. 
 
Conclusion: a multiple humanity as a way ahead for human rights discourse 
 
The multiplicity of human beings was long denied in classical, medieval and modern Western 
thought, which not only constructed the order of things on the out-there-ness of being, god and 
nature respectively, but generally gave this order a single hierarchical structure. Following a 
pattern already defined in the fifth-century B.C.E. (Livy, 1960), most human subjects were 
supposed to join this order as the limbs of a body; a body controlled by a thoughtful minority. 
Also when the concept of popular sovereignty came to be acknowledged, it continued to be 
constructed as the expression of a single entity, albeit self-determining. That is why, for example, 
Rousseau (1968) carefully distinguished the ideal general will from the actual, multiple and (in his 
view) unreliable popular will. In other words, Western intellectuals generally shared with the 
members of ruling classes the fear of mob rule (Latour, 1999). Moreover, when in the 
nineteenth-century social confrontations were channelled into political struggle, political parties 
subsumed, as collective subjects, the multiplicity of actual political stakeholders. So far, the 
participative structure of democratic societies has hardly improved.  
 
Human rights discourse mirrors the general political impasse produced by the specific modern 
centralisation of decision-making processes, to which most stakeholders can participate only 
through unaccountable representatives. On the one side, each and every human being is 
acknowledged as a legitimate object of human rights discourse, so that she is allowed to make 
use of the growing corpus of human rights instruments to defend and promote her human dignity 
and well-being. On the other side, the right of each and every human to be an active subject of 
human rights discourse by participating in the definition of her own rights has never been at 
stake. I argue that such a basic right is exercised de facto, because the worldwide appropriation of 
human rights language implies a process of vernacularisation that shifts the focus of human 
rights texts from their drafters to their readers and claimants. Nevertheless, the stakeholding 
position of these readers and claimants is still only partially recognized. In other words, human 
rights discourse acknowledges each and every human being as a bearer, but not as a producer of 
rights (Baldissone, 2010). In the light of the previous considerations, this incomplete recognition 
is hardly surprising, as in the West the majority of the population have been generally given a 
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merely practical social function. Directive and creative functions have been instead exerted by a 
minority who dealt with the ontological, theological and natural orders.  
 
Religious and scientific functionaries are still performing as mediators of their respective 
objective realities. Nevertheless, during the last fifty years the narratives that upheld the absolute 
out-there-ness of their objects of inquiry were widely questioned (Feyerabend, 1988). In 
particular, the recognition of the performativity of knowledge or, in Foucaldian terms, of the 
coextensiveness of knowledge and power (Foucault, 1980) reopened the whole theoretical space 
that seventeenth-century natural philosophers enclosed within a framework of absolute 
dichotomic oppositions. As observed realities cannot but artificially be separated from observers, 
and facts cannot but fictively be detached from values, the magic operations that produce 
objective realities were exposed as the result of the severance of cultural products (from gods to 
facts) from their producers (Latour, 1988). We can now retell these productive activities as 
ongoing processes of alliance-building and negotiation, which involve both human and non-
human actors. Therefore, we can also reconceptualise human rights as the result of negotiation 
processes, of which all humans are potential stakeholders. The wider the participation in these 
processes, the better will be the opportunity for the actual multiplicity of human subjects to be 
represented in ongoing settlements. From this perspective, a major task for human rights 
theorists is to devise participatory paths and procedures, so that increasing numbers of humans 
emerge as active subjects rather than passive objects of human rights discourse. By following 
such participatory paths, human rights discourse will overcome its fundamentalist heritage, and 
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